Russia Claims It Mined 500 Tons of Gold—But Is Quietly Dumping Reserves to Stay Afloat

Kozlov projected year-on-year growth of about 3 percent for gold, 7 percent for silver, and marginal growth for PGMs . He presented the numbers as evidence that Russia's mining sector continues to expand despite Western sanctions and technology restrictions.

How the claims compare to independent data

Gold: a 40–50% gap with the WGC and USGS

The U.S. Geological Survey's 2026 Mineral Commodity Summaries estimate Russia's 2025 gold mine production at roughly 310 tons . The World Gold Council, which tracks global mine supply through its data partner Metals Focus, placed Russia closer to the 330–345 ton range for 2025, based on publicly available country-level production updates .

Kozlov's claim of 485 tons for 2025 is therefore approximately 40 to 50 percent higher than these independent benchmarks . At 485 tons, Russia would overtake China's estimated 380 tons and become the largest gold miner in the world—a position it has not held in modern history .

No major new gold mines entered production in Russia in 2024 or 2025, and Western sanctions have restricted the supply of mining equipment and technology. Several large Russian gold miners have reported production figures that, when combined, fall well short of 485 tons, leading industry executives to describe Kozlov's totals as "difficult to reconcile with available data" .

Silver and PGMs: limited independent benchmarks

Kozlov's silver projection of 2,800–3,000 tons and PGM output of 134–137 tons are harder to fact-check directly, because neither the USGS nor the WGC has published granular 2025–2026 Russia-specific estimates for these metals. The most recent hard data comes from USGS reports covering 2022, when Russia accounted for approximately 23 percent of global PGM mine supply, approximately 43 percent of world palladium output, and 11 percent of platinum . Nornickel, Russia's dominant PGM miner, has stopped disclosing combined production figures publicly since 2024, further clouding verification .

The secrecy problem: four years without official data

Russia stopped publishing official mining statistics after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Kozlov's June 2026 interview was the first time the government shared production volumes in four years . Sanctions since 2022 have cut Russia off from traditional bullion markets like London and Zurich, rerouted gold trade through third countries, and made independent auditing of production and export figures nearly impossible .

Without company-level verification, audited trade data, or on-the-ground inspections—all blocked by sanctions and state secrecy—analysts cannot confirm whether Kozlov's figures represent actual mine output, or whether they include scrap recycling, artisanal production, or newly documented geological reserves rather than mined metal .

The contradiction: claiming records while selling reserves

The most striking tension in Kozlov's narrative is what is happening to Russia's sovereign gold reserves. While the Natural Resources Minister touts a production boom, the Central Bank of Russia has been quietly selling physical gold—for the first time in 25 years—to fund the government's budget deficit .

Key data points:

• 900,000 ounces sold in 2026: As of May 1, 2026, Russia's central bank gold reserves stood at 73.9 million ounces (approximately 2,298 tons), down 900,000 ounces (roughly 28 tons) since January 1. This marks the lowest level since March 2022 and the fastest four-month drawdown since 2002 .
• Liquidating the National Wealth Fund: Russia's National Wealth Fund—originally designed to stabilize the budget during oil-price shocks—has seen its gold holdings drop by 71 percent between May 2022 and January 2025, from 554.9 tons to just 160.2 tons . The fund's total liquid assets have shrunk from $113.5 billion to $51.6 billion over the same period .
• Budget-driven sales: The sales began in November 2025 and accelerated through early 2026. Moscow has been exchanging physical gold for yuan to plug a widening budget deficit driven by sustained military spending, at a pace that has seen combined gold and foreign currency sales exceed RUB 15 trillion ($150 billion) between 2022 and 2025, with an additional RUB 3.5 trillion ($35 billion) in the first two months of 2026 alone .

If Russia were truly producing 485 tons of gold per year, it would be bringing roughly 15 percent of the entire world's annual mine supply onshore. The fact that it is simultaneously liquidating sovereign gold—at the fastest rate since 2002—is a glaring contradiction that analysts say signals either inflated production figures, export bottlenecks under sanctions, or a political imperative to project strength .

What analysts think is really going on

Several explanations are circulating among commodity analysts and mining executives:

1. Inclusion of non-mine material: Kozlov's figures may blend mine production with recycled scrap, artisanal mining, and/or newly proven geological reserves—rather than reporting only mined metal as the WGC and USGS do .
2. Political timing: The figures were released just before the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Russia's flagship investor event, suggesting a political motive to project economic resilience and resource dominance while the country's liquid reserves shrink .
3. Reserve accounting, not production: Earlier in 2026, the Ministry of Natural Resources reported that Russia's documented gold reserves increased by 614 tons in a single year—a figure that describes geological resources added to the state balance sheet, not metal that was mined and refined . Analysts suspect similar categories may have leaked into Kozlov's production claims.

Bottom line

Kozlov's claim that Russia mined 485 tons of gold in 2025 and could reach 500 tons in 2026 is roughly 40 to 50 percent above what the WGC and USGS estimate. The gap is large enough that, if accurate, Russia would be the world's top gold producer. But the absence of verifiable company data, the technology constraints imposed by sanctions, and the simultaneous liquidation of sovereign gold reserves all point in the opposite direction. Until independent verification is possible—which remains unlikely given the blackout on official data and the ongoing sanctions regime—Kozlov's numbers should be treated as unconfirmed state claims rather than audited production figures .