The Strait of Hormuz Is Still a Warzone — and the Oil Clock Is Ticking

Traffic Has Collapsed to a Trickle

Before the conflict began on February 28, 2026, roughly 100 to 140 ships crossed the Strait of Hormuz each day, carrying about 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products . By mid-March, daily transits had fallen to about two ships, with Iran deciding which vessels could pass . A brief ceasefire window in mid-April allowed at least eight oil and gas tankers to cross in a single day , but Iran reclosed the strait shortly afterward, and commercial ships came under fire again . By April 27, six Iranian oil tankers were forced back by a US blockade, and only seven ships had crossed in the previous 24 hours, none carrying oil for the global market .

The live tracking site hormuzmonitor.com reports that daily transits remain below 10 ships during the crisis, a catastrophic drop from pre-war volumes . As of mid-March, hundreds of vessels remained trapped in the Persian Gulf . There are no precise public tallies of how many have since escaped — some transited under Iranian permission, and a handful moved during the brief April reopening, but the total number extracted through these channels or through the nascent US “guide” operation remains undisclosed.

Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority Formalizes Control

In March 2026, Iran established the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) to create a permit-based system for transiting the strait . Vessels must submit a “Vessel Information Declaration” with detailed ownership, insurance, crew, and cargo information before paying tolls for passage . The PGSA warns that any incomplete or inaccurate information will lead to denial of transit or even attack .

On May 18, the PGSA declared that any passage without Iranian permission would be considered “illegal” . The agency has communicated its directives through a formal X account and video statements, signaling Tehran’s intent to institutionalize its wartime control . A Supreme Leader adviser, Mohammad Mokhber, said on May 8 that the strait carries “strategic value comparable to a nuclear weapon” and that Iran “will not lose the strait under any circumstances” .

The US Treasury Department sanctioned the PGSA on May 28, calling it an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) extortion scheme that “flagrantly violates international law” . The sanction adds the PGSA to the Specially Designated Nationals list, marking the latest escalation in an economic standoff over who controls the waterway .

The US Military Tries to Guide Ships, but Iran Keeps Its Veto

On May 4, President Trump announced “Project Freedom,” an effort to guide non-combatant ships out of the strait. A US-led task force established an “enhanced security area” south of typical shipping routes and began coordinating vessel movements . However, the IRGC explicitly prohibits passage for US, Israeli, and Western allied vessels, and war risk insurance for the strait has been canceled since March 5 .

Wirth acknowledged that the decision to transit ultimately rests with shipowners, not charterers like Chevron: “The ship owner decides whether or not he wants to put his vessel and his crew through the strait” . Even if a US-Iran deal is reached, Wirth stressed that shipowners and insurers must feel conditions are safe before normal oil flows can resume . For now, the US can attempt to guide ships, but Iran retains effective veto power on the water through the threat of mines, boardings, and military attack .

Oil Buffers Running on Borrowed Time

The crisis has already become the largest energy supply disruption in history. The International Energy Agency called it “the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market,” with cumulative supply losses totaling 12.8 million barrels per day since February 28 . More than 14 million barrels per day of Gulf production were shut in by mid-May .

Two analyses from the Brookings Institution lay out the timeline. In a May 13 piece, Brookings noted the closure had blocked 20% of global oil and LNG trade, causing “the largest energy disruption the world has seen in decades” . A second piece on May 25, “The timing of the impending crude crisis,” warns that emergency oil releases from IEA members — begun March 11 and depleting by July 9 — provide a buffer of only 2.5 million barrels per day. By mid-July 2026, Brookings calculates, the full extent of temporary buffers will be exhausted, and a market adjustment of 7.1 million barrels per day — roughly 16% of global crude oil trade — will need to be absorbed .

BNP Paribas research independently echoes this warning: the use of regional bypass pipelines, commercial stock releases, and strategic reserves “are only partial and temporary solutions.” Without the restoration of flows through Hormuz, the bank warns, “the oil market will soon run out of options” . The world is currently drawing on reserves at a rate of more than 7 million barrels per day, or about 210 million barrels every month, to bridge the gap .

A Fragile Ceasefire and Persistent Danger

The diplomatic picture remains uncertain. Sources reference a “ceasefire in the Middle East war” that allowed the brief reopening in mid-April , and Wirth noted the attacks continue “even amid fragile U.S.-Iran ceasefire talks” . The current status of any preliminary ceasefire extension or nuclear negotiations as of late May is not fully confirmed in the available public record.

What is clear is that the waterway is not safe. Wirth’s warning of multiple attacks this week, some unreported, underscores that the Strait of Hormuz remains a kinetic warzone. Combined with the coming exhaustion of global oil buffers, the world is approaching a moment when the strategic and economic costs of the closure will be felt in full — with no clear resolution in sight.