NOAA forecasts a greater than 90% chance of a very strong El Niño during Northern Hemisphere fall and winter 2026–27, with a 75% chance of historic strength in October–December. FAO still expects 2026 global cereal production to be the second largest on record, which provides an important buffer even as it projects...
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Research answer

Create a landscape editorial hero image for this Studio Global article: How is the rapidly intensifying El Niño forecast by NOAA to have more than a 90% chance of becoming a very strong “super” event this autumn. Article summary: A very strong El Niño would most likely create a renewed, uneven supply shock: higher and more volatile agricultural prices, costlier food imports and fertilizer, and delayed disinflation—especially in import-dependent e. Topic tags: general, news, general web, user generated, government. Style: premium digital editorial illustration, source-backed research mood, clean composition, high detail, modern web publication hero. Use reference image context only for broad subject, composition, and topical grounding; do not copy the exact image. Avoid: logos, brand marks, copyrighted characters, real person likenesses, fake screenshots, UI text, readable text, watermark
NOAA’s outlook makes a powerful El Niño a material risk for commodity markets in late 2026 and early 2027. But it does not imply a uniform global food crisis. El Niño changes rainfall and temperatures differently across regions, creating crop losses in some places and better growing conditions in others. The broader risk is that weather disruption arrives while fertilizer, energy and shipping costs are already elevated.
NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center says El Niño is strengthening and assigns a greater-than-90% chance of a very strong event during Northern Hemisphere fall and winter 2026–27. For October–December 2026, it puts the probability of a historic-strength event at 75%. NOAA expects El Niño to persist through March–May 2027, while assigning a 55% chance of a return to ENSO-neutral conditions in April–June. 33
35
That timing matters because agricultural and price effects often emerge after weather patterns disrupt planting, yields, harvesting or transport. A strong forecast raises the probability of disruption; it does not determine the outcome for every crop or country.
El Niño can alter rainfall, heat and growing seasons across major producing regions. That makes rice, sugar, soybeans, corn and wheat vulnerable to episodes of drought, excess rain or harvest disruption. The market response is likely to be uneven: losses in one exporting region can be partly offset by favorable weather or larger harvests elsewhere.
Rice deserves particular attention because it is a staple food across many import-dependent countries. FAO forecasts global rice production of 553.1 million tonnes in 2026/27, down 1.9% from the previous season’s record, citing reduced producer margins and weather conditions mostly associated with El Niño. 18
There is also a substantial counterweight to the worst-case narrative. FAO forecasts total global cereal production of 2.98 billion tonnes in 2026—2% below 2025, but still the second-largest harvest on record. Ample supplies and stocks can cushion localized weather damage, especially if major exporters avoid simultaneous losses. 18
The World Bank’s baseline assumed food-price increases would remain modest, projecting its overall food commodity index to rise by around 2.5% in 2026. However, that outlook explicitly depends on easing supply disruptions and identifies a stronger-than-expected El Niño, persistently high energy and fertilizer prices, biofuel demand, and trade restrictions as upside risks. 62
JPMorgan’s estimates illustrate how those risks can compound. The bank estimates that a super El Niño on its own could raise peak global food inflation by about 0.7 percentage points. If accompanied by an oil shock, it estimates the impact could rise to 1.3–1.5 percentage points, with global headline inflation roughly 0.3 percentage points higher. 1
6
Those figures should be treated as conditional scenario analysis, not a forecast that food inflation will necessarily reach a specific level. The result will depend on the severity and geographic pattern of weather events, crop responses, energy prices and governments’ trade policies.
A weather shock becomes more economically damaging when farm inputs and transport are expensive. Fertilizer costs affect crop economics before a harvest is lost: farmers facing costly inputs may reduce application rates, potentially weakening yields later in the season.
The World Bank reported that urea prices surged by nearly 46% month on month between February and March 2026 amid the Middle East conflict. 50 Its broader commodity outlook also warned that prolonged disruptions could keep energy and fertilizer costs high and push food prices above baseline projections.
62
Higher oil, gas and freight costs can therefore affect food prices through several channels at once:
El Niño itself is not the main driver of European gas availability. Any gas-market stress would depend more directly on physical LNG supply, storage levels, shipping routes and energy disruptions. Still, higher energy prices can magnify the inflationary consequences of an El Niño-related food shock.
Food and fuel take up a larger share of household budgets in many lower-income and import-dependent economies. That makes them more exposed when local currencies weaken or global food and energy prices rise.
For central banks, this is a difficult supply-shock problem. Higher policy rates cannot restore rain, lower fertilizer costs or reopen shipping routes. Yet policymakers may have to keep rates higher for longer if food and energy inflation feeds into broader expectations or currency pressure. JPMorgan’s warning that the combined El Niño-and-oil scenario could add 0.3 percentage points to global inflation points to this risk, particularly for emerging markets. 1
Advanced-economy central banks may be more able to look through a temporary food-price shock. The key question is whether it remains concentrated in volatile items or spreads into wages, services and longer-term inflation expectations.
Agricultural futures may react before actual physical shortages become clear, so the likely market pattern is greater volatility and episodic rallies rather than a simple, sustained rise across every commodity.
The most exposed businesses and countries are likely to be those with concentrated risks:
At the same time, producers in regions receiving favorable rainfall can benefit from stronger yields and higher prices. That is why global aggregates can conceal sharp regional differences.
The gravest consequences would fall on households already coping with conflict, poor harvests, weak currencies or high debt. The World Bank has warned that El Niño could threaten rice production in South Asia, Southern Africa and parts of East Asia; in affected regions, it cited the potential for steep output declines. 54
For low-income households, higher food prices quickly reduce purchasing power. For humanitarian agencies, the same rise means a fixed budget reaches fewer people. Export restrictions can make this worse by turning local production problems into wider shortages and price spikes.
A very strong El Niño would raise risks, but it would not make severe global inflation inevitable. Several factors could limit the damage:
The most useful way to interpret the outlook is as a warning about interacting vulnerabilities. NOAA’s forecast increases the likelihood of major weather disruption. Whether that becomes a broad food and inflation shock will depend on whether energy, fertilizer, shipping and trade stresses ease—or intensify at the same time. 33
18
62
Studio Global AI
This page includes a source-backed answer you can continue inside Studio Global.
NOAA forecasts a greater than 90% chance of a very strong El Niño during Northern Hemisphere fall and winter 2026–27, with a 75% chance of historic strength in October–December.
NOAA forecasts a greater than 90% chance of a very strong El Niño during Northern Hemisphere fall and winter 2026–27, with a 75% chance of historic strength in October–December. FAO still expects 2026 global cereal production to be the second largest on record, which provides an important buffer even as it projects rice output to fall 1.9% to 553.1 million tonnes in 2026/27.
JPMorgan estimates that a super El Niño could add 0.7 percentage points to peak global food inflation; alongside an oil shock, it estimates a 1.3–1.5 point food inflation effect and a 0.3 point increase in global head...
NOAA forecasts a greater than 90% chance of a very strong El Niño during Northern Hemisphere fall and winter 2026–27, with a 75% chance of historic strength in October–December. FAO still expects 2026 global cereal production to be the second largest on record, which provides an important buffer even as it projects...
Published byEdited with GPT-5.6 TerraImages generated with GPT Image 2
Research answer

Create a landscape editorial hero image for this Studio Global article: How is the rapidly intensifying El Niño forecast by NOAA to have more than a 90% chance of becoming a very strong “super” event this autumn. Article summary: A very strong El Niño would most likely create a renewed, uneven supply shock: higher and more volatile agricultural prices, costlier food imports and fertilizer, and delayed disinflation—especially in import-dependent e. Topic tags: general, news, general web, user generated, government. Style: premium digital editorial illustration, source-backed research mood, clean composition, high detail, modern web publication hero. Use reference image context only for broad subject, composition, and topical grounding; do not copy the exact image. Avoid: logos, brand marks, copyrighted characters, real person likenesses, fake screenshots, UI text, readable text, watermark
NOAA’s outlook makes a powerful El Niño a material risk for commodity markets in late 2026 and early 2027. But it does not imply a uniform global food crisis. El Niño changes rainfall and temperatures differently across regions, creating crop losses in some places and better growing conditions in others. The broader risk is that weather disruption arrives while fertilizer, energy and shipping costs are already elevated.
NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center says El Niño is strengthening and assigns a greater-than-90% chance of a very strong event during Northern Hemisphere fall and winter 2026–27. For October–December 2026, it puts the probability of a historic-strength event at 75%. NOAA expects El Niño to persist through March–May 2027, while assigning a 55% chance of a return to ENSO-neutral conditions in April–June. 33
35
That timing matters because agricultural and price effects often emerge after weather patterns disrupt planting, yields, harvesting or transport. A strong forecast raises the probability of disruption; it does not determine the outcome for every crop or country.
El Niño can alter rainfall, heat and growing seasons across major producing regions. That makes rice, sugar, soybeans, corn and wheat vulnerable to episodes of drought, excess rain or harvest disruption. The market response is likely to be uneven: losses in one exporting region can be partly offset by favorable weather or larger harvests elsewhere.
Rice deserves particular attention because it is a staple food across many import-dependent countries. FAO forecasts global rice production of 553.1 million tonnes in 2026/27, down 1.9% from the previous season’s record, citing reduced producer margins and weather conditions mostly associated with El Niño. 18
There is also a substantial counterweight to the worst-case narrative. FAO forecasts total global cereal production of 2.98 billion tonnes in 2026—2% below 2025, but still the second-largest harvest on record. Ample supplies and stocks can cushion localized weather damage, especially if major exporters avoid simultaneous losses. 18
The World Bank’s baseline assumed food-price increases would remain modest, projecting its overall food commodity index to rise by around 2.5% in 2026. However, that outlook explicitly depends on easing supply disruptions and identifies a stronger-than-expected El Niño, persistently high energy and fertilizer prices, biofuel demand, and trade restrictions as upside risks. 62
JPMorgan’s estimates illustrate how those risks can compound. The bank estimates that a super El Niño on its own could raise peak global food inflation by about 0.7 percentage points. If accompanied by an oil shock, it estimates the impact could rise to 1.3–1.5 percentage points, with global headline inflation roughly 0.3 percentage points higher. 1
6
Those figures should be treated as conditional scenario analysis, not a forecast that food inflation will necessarily reach a specific level. The result will depend on the severity and geographic pattern of weather events, crop responses, energy prices and governments’ trade policies.
A weather shock becomes more economically damaging when farm inputs and transport are expensive. Fertilizer costs affect crop economics before a harvest is lost: farmers facing costly inputs may reduce application rates, potentially weakening yields later in the season.
The World Bank reported that urea prices surged by nearly 46% month on month between February and March 2026 amid the Middle East conflict. 50 Its broader commodity outlook also warned that prolonged disruptions could keep energy and fertilizer costs high and push food prices above baseline projections.
62
Higher oil, gas and freight costs can therefore affect food prices through several channels at once:
El Niño itself is not the main driver of European gas availability. Any gas-market stress would depend more directly on physical LNG supply, storage levels, shipping routes and energy disruptions. Still, higher energy prices can magnify the inflationary consequences of an El Niño-related food shock.
Food and fuel take up a larger share of household budgets in many lower-income and import-dependent economies. That makes them more exposed when local currencies weaken or global food and energy prices rise.
For central banks, this is a difficult supply-shock problem. Higher policy rates cannot restore rain, lower fertilizer costs or reopen shipping routes. Yet policymakers may have to keep rates higher for longer if food and energy inflation feeds into broader expectations or currency pressure. JPMorgan’s warning that the combined El Niño-and-oil scenario could add 0.3 percentage points to global inflation points to this risk, particularly for emerging markets. 1
Advanced-economy central banks may be more able to look through a temporary food-price shock. The key question is whether it remains concentrated in volatile items or spreads into wages, services and longer-term inflation expectations.
Agricultural futures may react before actual physical shortages become clear, so the likely market pattern is greater volatility and episodic rallies rather than a simple, sustained rise across every commodity.
The most exposed businesses and countries are likely to be those with concentrated risks:
At the same time, producers in regions receiving favorable rainfall can benefit from stronger yields and higher prices. That is why global aggregates can conceal sharp regional differences.
The gravest consequences would fall on households already coping with conflict, poor harvests, weak currencies or high debt. The World Bank has warned that El Niño could threaten rice production in South Asia, Southern Africa and parts of East Asia; in affected regions, it cited the potential for steep output declines. 54
For low-income households, higher food prices quickly reduce purchasing power. For humanitarian agencies, the same rise means a fixed budget reaches fewer people. Export restrictions can make this worse by turning local production problems into wider shortages and price spikes.
A very strong El Niño would raise risks, but it would not make severe global inflation inevitable. Several factors could limit the damage:
The most useful way to interpret the outlook is as a warning about interacting vulnerabilities. NOAA’s forecast increases the likelihood of major weather disruption. Whether that becomes a broad food and inflation shock will depend on whether energy, fertilizer, shipping and trade stresses ease—or intensify at the same time. 33
18
62
Studio Global AI
This page includes a source-backed answer you can continue inside Studio Global.
NOAA forecasts a greater than 90% chance of a very strong El Niño during Northern Hemisphere fall and winter 2026–27, with a 75% chance of historic strength in October–December.
NOAA forecasts a greater than 90% chance of a very strong El Niño during Northern Hemisphere fall and winter 2026–27, with a 75% chance of historic strength in October–December. FAO still expects 2026 global cereal production to be the second largest on record, which provides an important buffer even as it projects rice output to fall 1.9% to 553.1 million tonnes in 2026/27.
JPMorgan estimates that a super El Niño could add 0.7 percentage points to peak global food inflation; alongside an oil shock, it estimates a 1.3–1.5 point food inflation effect and a 0.3 point increase in global head...