Russia’s fiscal plan for 2026 is being revised under the weight of much higher war-related spending. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov says the federal deficit should remain within 3% of GDP—nearly twice the 1.6% of GDP target set in the budget law—but the eight-month figures show how quickly the original plan has been overtaken.
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The deficit is already above the original full-year target
Russia recorded a federal budget deficit of 5.8 trillion rubles, or 2.5% of GDP, in January through August 2026. That exceeded the original full-year target of 3.8 trillion rubles, or 1.6% of GDP. Federal expenditure rose 14.7% year on year over the period, while revenue rose 9.2%, leaving spending growth ahead of income growth.
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August itself produced a 660 billion-ruble surplus, the largest monthly surplus in a year. It was driven principally by dividend payments from major state banks and companies on their previous-year profits; Bloomberg reported 691 billion rubles in such dividend receipts. That is meaningful monthly cash flow, but it is a one-off revenue effect rather than evidence that the accumulated deficit has been eliminated.
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Earlier government budget-portal data had already suggested that 2026 spending could rise above plan while revenue remained unchanged, widening the planned ruble deficit by more than 1 trillion rubles.
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War spending is absorbing budget capacity
Analysis of Finance Ministry data by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs found military spending of 10.7 trillion rubles in the first half of 2026—30% higher than in the same period of 2025. That amount equaled 4.7% of projected full-year GDP and 10.5% of first-half GDP.
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For perspective, Russia’s 2026 budget had planned 14.9 trillion rubles in military expenditure, or 6.3% of GDP. The first-half total was therefore already roughly 72% of that full-year plan.
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The scale is also far beyond the prewar baseline: reporting based on the same budget data says first-half military spending was more than five times the level in 2021.
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This does not by itself prove the final annual military total. But it helps explain why the government is putting limits on civilian spending: when defense and security needs rise faster than anticipated, the fastest way to preserve cash for them is to postpone discretionary or non-essential civilian disbursements. Reports in August said agencies had been told to defer non-essential spending amid a funding shortage and a wider deficit.
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How Moscow plans to finance the gap
Siluanov has said that additional spending needs emerged during budget execution and that further funding sources would be provided. Reported measures include drawing on accumulated account balances and borrowing on the domestic debt market.
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Tax policy is another part of the response. Russia raised taxes in 2026 in an attempt to contain the deficit while financing military operations, including an increase in VAT to 22% at the start of the year.
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The Finance Ministry is also preparing tax-law changes to account for companies’ costs of defending facilities and repairing damage from drone attacks. The proposal shows that the fiscal effects of the war are not confined to direct military appropriations: protection and reconstruction of domestic assets are becoming a budget and tax-policy issue as well.
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Civilian programs face a tougher trade-off
The pressure is visible in the sequencing of spending. Delaying civilian programs does not remove the government’s obligations; it changes when they are paid. But it allows the Kremlin to direct near-term resources toward defense, security and war-related needs while it raises revenue and borrows.
The wider strain also includes measures beyond ordinary budgeting. In late August, Putin issued a decree permitting critical infrastructure to be transferred to external management if owners fail to protect it adequately, including from drone attacks. Carnegie’s analysis notes that the mechanism may also create a route for asset redistribution.
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Together, deferred civilian outlays, higher taxes, borrowing, infrastructure-protection costs and proposed repair-related tax changes point to a budget coping with multiple demands at once—not just battlefield spending, but also the cost of protecting and restoring assets inside Russia.
The 2027 target is lower, but rests on assumptions
Putin has said the preliminary 2027 budget deficit is expected to be about 2% of GDP, based on what he described as a very conservative oil-price assumption of roughly $50 a barrel.
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That is a smaller deficit than the 2026 ceiling now discussed by the Finance Ministry, but it is a projection rather than a guarantee. Its feasibility will depend on revenue, oil prices, borrowing conditions and, above all, the path of military and security spending.
Putin has publicly argued that the growing deficit poses no “critical” risk and can be managed. He made that assessment when the January–July deficit had reached 2.8% of GDP, already above the original annual target.
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The central takeaway is straightforward: the August surplus offered temporary relief, but the January–August deficit and the pace of defense spending show why Russia has moved from a 1.6% deficit plan toward a 3% ceiling—and why civilian spending is increasingly being treated as the adjustable part of the budget.
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