Because of fears that electronic communications or visits by officials could reveal his location to foreign intelligence services, access to him has reportedly been tightly restricted.
The result is a situation sometimes described by analysts as “invisible leadership”—a supreme leader who formally heads the state but rarely appears and communicates only through indirect channels.
To avoid electronic surveillance, Mojtaba Khamenei is reported to rely on a low‑tech communication system involving handwritten directives delivered by trusted couriers.
According to multiple reports citing officials familiar with the system, messages are written by hand, sealed, and carried through a chain of intermediaries—sometimes traveling long distances by vehicle or motorcycle—to reach government officials or military commanders. Replies return through the same route.
This approach is designed to prevent interception or geolocation by advanced surveillance systems that might track phone calls, encrypted messaging, or digital signals.
While secure, the method also slows communication and limits how directly the supreme leader can manage day‑to‑day governance.
Because of Mojtaba Khamenei’s isolation and limited communication, many reports describe a shift toward collective leadership among senior military and political figures.
Instead of one dominant authority, key decisions on war strategy, diplomacy, and internal security appear increasingly shaped by a small group of powerful officials closely tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Among the figures frequently cited in reporting and analysis are:
This group is often described as a tight "band of brothers" of security‑state elites who help translate the supreme leader’s directives into operational decisions.
Analysts say Mojtaba Khamenei’s position differs significantly from the power wielded by his father.
Ali Khamenei spent more than three decades consolidating authority across Iran’s clerical institutions, military leadership, and political factions. That long tenure gave him the ability to arbitrate disputes between rival groups inside the regime.
Mojtaba, by contrast, faces several structural limitations:
Some intelligence assessments say he is still playing a “crucial role” in shaping Iran’s strategy in the ongoing conflict and negotiations.
However, those same assessments note that Iran’s leadership now appears more fragmented, with the IRGC and senior political officials exercising greater influence than before.
Even months after the leadership transition, significant uncertainty remains about how much direct control Mojtaba Khamenei exercises over Iran’s policies.
What appears clear from available reporting is that the country is operating under a hybrid power structure:
The result is a leadership system that looks far more decentralized—and more militarized—than the one that existed under Ali Khamenei.
Whether that arrangement proves temporary or becomes the new normal for Iran’s political system remains an open question.
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