Putin’s Elite Problem: Why Russia’s Business and Political Class Is Turning on Him in 2026

The cracks in Vladimir Putin’s support base look different in spring 2026 than they did a year ago. Public approval ratings are falling, but the more significant shift is happening inside boardrooms and government corridors. The people who run Russia’s economy and its political machinery are increasingly airing frustration with a leader they describe as isolated, uncompromising, and dangerously unwilling to change course in Ukraine.

Business leaders are “profoundly disappointed,” one source told The Guardian, noting “there’s definitely been a shift in mood among the elites this year” . A former senior Kremlin official, writing anonymously, described a ruling class that is now quietly imagining a future without Putin . The change is not yet a revolt—Putin’s coercive apparatus remains intact—but for the first time since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the regime’s most important constituencies are signaling deep unease.

The Polls Are Slipping—and the Kremlin Knows It

Putin’s domestic approval ratings have fallen to levels not seen since the invasion began. The state-controlled pollster VTsIOM recorded a seventh consecutive weekly decline in late April 2026, bringing Putin’s approval down to 65.6%, the lowest figure from that agency since before February 2022 . The independent Levada Center also reported a slide, from 85% in October 2025 to 80% in March 2026 . The independent Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) found that by mid-May, only 71% of respondents said Putin was performing “rather well” as president—the lowest in a year .

The Kremlin’s discomfort with these numbers became unmistakable when VTsIOM abruptly switched its polling methodology. In mid-May, the agency began conducting door-to-door interviews instead of phone surveys, and Putin’s approval immediately ticked upward to 66.8% . This methodology change, widely interpreted as a maneuver to arrest the narrative of decline, suggests the real level of public confidence is weaker than the official numbers imply .

For context, Putin ended 2025 with an approval rating near 85% according to the Levada Center, which means the year-to-date decline has been dramatic . Trust figures are also eroding: by late April, nearly a quarter of Russians—23.3%—told VTsIOM they did not trust the president, compared to less than 15% earlier in the year .

An Economy Exhausted by War

Russia’s war-driven economy has entered a phase the IMF describes as near-stagnant. GDP growth slowed to 0.6% in 2025, and forecasts for 2026 sit at just 0.8% . That is a sharp deceleration from the 3.6% to 3.8% growth rates Russia posted in 2023–2024, which were themselves inflated by massive military spending .

The government’s 2025 budget devoted a record 13.5 trillion rubles to defense—roughly five times the nominal amount spent in 2021—and the “guns versus butter” tradeoff is now impossible to ignore . Social spending has been cut, and taxes on businesses and households have been raised to cover the shortfall . Inflation remains stubbornly high, and the Central Bank’s key interest rate hit 21% in late 2024, pushing commercial borrowing costs toward 30% .

Senior industrial managers describe the current period as the most difficult since the 1998 ruble crisis . The state is also seizing private assets on a large scale—a trend that has further alienated the business elite . “The less resources the state has, the more it will take away from the elites,” one analyst told Charter97 . A former Kremlin insider reported that elites are now quietly distancing themselves as the economic pie shrinks .

Dissent Spreads—Even Among Loyalists

The most striking feature of the current mood is that frustration is no longer confined to the regime’s traditional critics. Z-propagandists and pro-war social media personalities have begun openly criticizing the Kremlin—a remarkable break from the unified messaging of the war’s early years . Even loyalists, the Carnegie Endowment notes, are now complaining about the ever-tightening restrictions and repression that characterize daily life in Russia .

This represents a significant change in the regime’s ecosystem. For years, the Kremlin’s ultra-patriotic cheerleaders acted as a shock absorber, attacking anyone who questioned the war. Now some of those same voices are turning their fire on the leadership, frustrated by military stagnation and what they see as Putin’s inability to achieve a clear victory .

“For the first time since 2023, economic decline has been recorded due to the costs of the war, and the army’s ‘victories’ are becoming a subject of ridicule,” RBC Ukraine reported in May 2026, summarizing a broad sentiment taking hold across previously apolitical Russians, elites, and hardline supporters of the war .

An Isolated Leader, Fixated on Donbas

Despite the mounting discontent, Putin appears determined to push forward. The Guardian reported that those in his orbit describe him as isolated and increasingly disconnected from the concerns of his own elite . Western intelligence officials cited in the same report note that Putin’s inner circle is rapidly losing faith in the war’s aims, yet the president remains committed to seizing the entirety of Ukraine’s Donbas region—a goal the elite increasingly regard as unachievable .

This widening gap between elite sentiment and the president’s objectives is the core of the problem for Putin. Pressure groups inside the Kremlin are reportedly unhappy with the president’s isolation from both the outside world and his own entourage . “The dominant sentiment among elites is disappointment,” Meduza reported, citing sources inside the presidential administration, government, and State Duma . That disappointment has deepened as the war drags into its fifth year and economic pain becomes harder to hide.

No Revolt—Yet

The shift is real, but it remains contained within the system. No organized opposition movement has emerged, and the coercive apparatus of the state—the security services, the courts, the military command—still answers to Putin. Russia’s business elite, whatever their private views, have largely refrained from public opposition because the cost of dissent is demonstrably high .

What makes 2026 different is the combination of pressures: a stalling economy, falling public trust, open complaints from previously reliable loyalists, and a leader whose single-minded pursuit of territorial gains in Donbas is no longer aligned with what the elites see as the country’s interest. The Atlantic Council observed in February 2026 that “there is currently little to indicate that the country is close to a dramatic political shift,” but the growing friction between Putin and the people who sustain his power is becoming harder to dismiss .