The production problem is being compounded by a transport problem. Prolonged rainfall deficits and recurring heat pushed the Po, Rhine and Danube to record-low levels in August, according to the Joint Research Centre and Copernicus monitoring. The Rhine also reached record lows at several points in Germany and the Netherlands.
Low water does not stop shipping completely, but it reduces the amount each vessel can carry. Operators may need more vessels, slower routes or a switch to rail and road, all of which can increase freight costs and reduce reliability. The Rhine, Danube and Po serve important industrial and agricultural regions, so the disruption can affect the movement of grain, animal feed, fertilizer and other commodities at the same time that harvest expectations are weakening.
That creates a multiplier effect: a smaller harvest can increase import demand, while shallow waterways make those imports more expensive to deliver. Europe may also have less capacity to help cushion shortages elsewhere in global markets.
The Black Sea is another potential pressure point. Recent attacks on agricultural export facilities and commercial vessels have disrupted Russian and Ukrainian flows of oil and grains, according to Reuters. The available evidence does not quantify how much of any current Ukrainian export reduction is directly attributable to Europe’s drought, but further disruption would reduce the flexibility of an already stressed trading system.
The Strait of Hormuz disruption affects the food system through energy and fertilizer. FAO reporting says around 1.3 million tonnes of fertilizer a month can no longer transit the strait, while the World Bank reported a 46% month-on-month rise in urea prices and an 8% increase in agricultural price indices linked to disrupted oil, gas and fertilizer flows.
Higher energy prices raise the cost of irrigation, drying, storage and freight. Higher fertilizer prices can encourage farmers to apply less fertilizer or delay purchases, potentially reducing yields in a later planting season. These effects are especially serious for countries that depend heavily on imported fuel, fertilizer or food.
The World Bank put the probability of El Niño emerging by mid-2026 and continuing into 2027 at 61–87%, warning that it could threaten production in South Asia, Southern Africa and parts of East Asia. If that forecast materializes, it could create weather stress in other major producing regions while Europe is already dealing with crop and transport losses.
That is a risk of correlation, not proof that El Niño caused Europe’s current drought. The available sources also do not establish a precise statistical estimate for how much climate change has increased the likelihood of the current soil-moisture deficits. The strongest supported conclusion is narrower: Europe’s drought is worsening, and simultaneous shocks in other producing regions would make global markets harder to stabilize.
The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2026 report shows that global hunger declined for a third consecutive year, but the improvement remains fragile. An estimated 645 million people—7.8% of the world’s population—experienced hunger in 2025. Africa accounted for 309 million of those people, with a hunger prevalence of 20.0%, compared with 6.0% in Asia and 4.8% in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The same report estimates that about 2.1 billion people experienced moderate or severe food insecurity in 2025. These figures do not prove that Africa will account for more than half of global food insecurity by 2030; that specific projection is not supported by the available evidence. They do show why new price, input and trade shocks would be unevenly felt, with import-dependent and already vulnerable households facing the greatest exposure.
The immediate objective is to stop a regional drought from becoming a broader affordability and access crisis:
Europe’s heatwave is therefore best understood as a stress test of the global food system. The immediate damage is regional, but the consequences can travel through crop markets, waterways, fertilizer prices and trade corridors. The evidence points to rising vulnerability—not yet a single, fully quantified global food crisis.