Vietnam and Thailand elevated ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in May 2025, during Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s visit to Hanoi . To Lam’s trip is the next step: translating that framework into a signed action programme that will guide cooperation for the next five decades .
The centerpiece of the Thailand leg is the “Three Connections” initiative, a cooperation framework agreed in principle by the two governments in November 2022 . The three pillars cover:
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow confirmed that Thailand and Vietnam are “working on an action plan” expected to be signed during the visit, describing it as a “key mechanism to promote a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” . Vietnamese Ambassador to Thailand Phan Chi Thanh made the same point: a “detailed action programme involving ministries, agencies and localities from both sides” is the primary deliverable .
Thailand is Vietnam’s second‑largest ASEAN investor, with 797 active projects worth US$15.4 billion in registered capital . Bilateral trade has been accelerating sharply: in the first four months of 2026, two‑way turnover reached nearly $8.6 billion, up 24% compared to the same period in 2025 . The two sides have previously set a target of $25 billion in bilateral trade, and the visit is expected to reinforce that goal .
For Vietnam, Thailand represents more than a market—it is a critical overland corridor and a logistics partner that can help Vietnamese manufacturers plug into regional supply chains. Closer integration, as the ambassador noted, “will help Vietnam further expand its global trade networks by leveraging Thailand’s strong regional and international supply chains” .
Beyond economics, the two leaders are expected to discuss ASEAN centrality, the South China Sea, and Mekong sub‑regional cooperation . The timing also carries symbolic weight: the visit falls during the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations, and a Thai naval vessel was already sent to Vietnam in May as part of the celebrations . The leaders are expected to build on that with additional cultural and people‑to‑people exchanges.
To Lam arrives in Singapore on May 29 for a state visit at the invitation of President Tharman Shanmugaratnam. But the day’s centerpiece will be his address that evening, when he becomes the first Vietnamese leader to deliver the opening keynote at the IISS Shangri‑La Dialogue, Asia’s most influential defense and security forum .
Vietnam and Singapore upgraded relations to a CSP in March 2025, during To Lam’s previous visit as Party General Secretary. That announcement was accompanied by several MOUs on digital transformation, combating transnational crime, and offshore wind power trade cooperation . Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong noted at the time that the CSP was significant because it was “Singapore’s first with an ASEAN Member State” .
The upcoming state visit is intended to move those agreements from memoranda to binding implementation. Singapore’s ambassador to Vietnam, Rajpal Singh, said the two countries aim to “cooperate on solving common issues, for mutual benefit, and strengthen cooperation in new fields such as digital, advanced manufacturing, and high‑quality education and training” .
Singapore has signaled a clear interest in partnerships that go beyond traditional investment. The March 2025 upgrade included MOUs on cross‑border QR code payments, digital development, and innovation . The state visit is expected to produce further announcements in the digital economy, green energy, and carbon‑credit collaboration .
This marks a deliberate shift for the Vietnam‑Singapore relationship. For decades, the economic pillar was dominated by the Vietnam‑Singapore Industrial Parks (VSIPs). Now both sides are explicitly pushing into areas—semiconductors, fintech, offshore wind, and advanced manufacturing—that align with Vietnam’s ambition to move up the value chain.
To Lam’s keynote on May 29 comes with high stakes. The 2026 Shangri‑La Dialogue runs from May 29–31, and its fifth plenary is dedicated to “China’s Cooperative Partnerships in the Asia‑Pacific” . In 2025, China canceled a plenary on its own security altogether. The choice of a Vietnamese leader to open the forum thus sends multiple signals.
Asia Times assessed the selection as a marker of “Vietnam’s elevated standing in regional security conversations,” noting that it offers Hanoi an opportunity to “reassure partners that its strategic autonomy remains intact, even as its institutional ties with Beijing deepen” . The address will be closely watched for how To Lam frames the region’s security architecture—whether he emphasizes ASEAN‑led mechanisms, great‑power balancing, or a more assertive Vietnamese vision for regional order.
Viewed as a single diplomatic campaign, To Lam’s back‑to‑back visits reveal a Hanoi strategy that is simultaneously economic and strategic.
The risk, as some analysts note, is that the Shangri‑La appearance may be overshadowed by larger powers’ agendas. But for Vietnam, simply standing at the podium as the first ASEAN head of state to open the dialogue may be the deliverable that matters most.