Meta’s $15 billion bond sale landed amid a concentrated wave of Big Tech borrowing for infrastructure and AI investment. The deal drew a large order book, but its long-term borrowing cost—and rising credit-risk measures across several technology issuers—show why strong demand should not be mistaken for inexpensive financing.
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Four major deals, one busy stretch
Microsoft, Oracle and Alphabet priced or pursued debt deals from October 29 through early November, followed by Meta’s five-part dollar-bond offering on November 3.
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| Company |
Deal and timing |
What the terms suggest |
| Microsoft |
Priced $25 billion of notes on October 29, split across ten series, including floating- and fixed-rate notes. 37 |
Its reported 10-year yield was about 5.5%. 20 |
| Oracle |
Sold $10 billion of bonds on November 2, alongside $10 billion of equity. 18 |
Its reported 10-year bond yield was about 8%. 20 |
| Alphabet |
Was seeking €6 billion in its second euro-denominated bond sale of the year as of November 3. 17 |
It offered higher yields than in its May euro sale, according to the report. 17 |
| Meta |
Raised $15 billion in five dollar-bond tranches on November 3, with maturities spanning five to 30 years. 1 5 |
The sale drew about $58 billion of orders; its 30-year notes yielded roughly 7.5%. 5 |
The yield comparisons are reported figures, not a like-for-like assessment of credit risk: maturities and deal terms differ. They do, however, illustrate how borrowing costs varied across these issuers during the same financing wave.
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Meta’s dollar sale was part of a broader effort to borrow in multiple currencies. Its subsequent euro-bond offering drew reported orders of €53 billion, but that order-book figure is not the same as the amount ultimately raised.
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Big order books do not mean investors are indifferent to price
Meta’s roughly $58 billion of orders—about four times the $15 billion dollar deal—shows that investors were willing to buy the bonds at the offered terms.
5 At the same time, the roughly 7.5% yield on the 30-year notes indicates that this demand came with a substantial stated borrowing cost.
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The distinction matters: an oversubscribed deal answers whether there was demand at a given price, not whether investors are unconcerned about risk. Yields, spreads over government bonds and new-issue premiums are related but different measures. The available reporting does not provide directly comparable new-issue premium data for all four companies, so order-book size alone cannot settle whether investors are becoming fatigued.
Meta’s spending and S&P outlook put cash generation in focus
Meta has forecast capital expenditure of $135 billion to $145 billion for 2026, largely driven by AI investment, according to Reuters.
1 One secondary report put a recent quarter’s capital spending at $34.91 billion and operating cash flow at $32.79 billion—a difference of about $2.12 billion.
3 That simple comparison is not a substitute for the company’s full free-cash-flow calculation, but it illustrates why investors are watching how quickly spending translates into cash generation.
S&P revised Meta’s outlook to negative while affirming its ratings. The agency said adjusted leverage could rise above the 1.0x level it identifies as its downgrade threshold for the ‘AA-’ issuer rating as early as 2027.
40 S&P separately assigned an ‘AA-’ issue rating to the proposed notes and said the issuance would not affect the issuer rating.
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A negative outlook is a warning about possible future credit deterioration, not a downgrade. For Meta, the central question is whether cash generated by the business can keep pace with investment and debt obligations over time.
Credit markets are distinguishing among borrowers
Credit-default swaps (CDS) are instruments that provide protection against default; their spreads offer one market-based indicator of the cost of that protection. A chart cited by Axios shows five-year CDS spreads rising between October 2024 and October 2026 for Alphabet, Microsoft and Oracle. Oracle’s spread rose from about 37.7 to 294.4 basis points, compared with increases from about 32.5 to 91.6 for Alphabet and 18.2 to 58.9 for Microsoft.
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Those movements point to higher priced credit risk for these companies, especially Oracle, but do not by themselves predict defaults or prove that AI investment alone caused the changes. Separately, LSEG reported that hyperscaler bond spreads had moved above the broader U.S. investment-grade corporate index by October 2026.
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The borrowing rates reported for Oracle and Microsoft also show that companies funding the same broad technology build-out do not face identical financing costs: their reported 10-year yields were about 8% and 5.5%, respectively.
20 Oracle’s bonds were rated Baa2 by Moody’s and BBB- by S&P in the cited market analysis, both investment-grade ratings.
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The longer-term test is refinancing, not just today’s demand
Goldman Sachs analyst Amanda Lynam was reported as estimating that the five largest hyperscalers had issued $271 billion in debt year to date.
20 That figure covers those five companies; it should not be confused with estimates for broader AI-related corporate borrowing.
The next question is whether investment produces enough cash to support the debt. Moody’s has warned that AI infrastructure financing is expanding private credit beyond traditional corporate lending, and that loans coming due between 2027 and 2029 could test weaker borrowers’ ability to refinance.
44 Moody’s also expects capital spending by the five largest U.S. hyperscalers and CoreWeave to approach $1 trillion in 2027, financed through cash flow, debt and other structures.
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The evidence points to a financing boom that remains open to major borrowers, but at prices and credit conditions that are not uniform. Meta’s oversubscribed sale shows access to capital; its long-term yield, the changing risk indicators and the approaching refinancing test show why access alone does not establish that the spending boom is sustainable.
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