Paolo Ardoino’s BIS Stablecoin Rebuttal Was Reported—but the Evidence Is Thin

The most defensible answer is narrower than the original question suggests: a public critique by Tether CEO Paolo Ardoino was reported, but the available reporting does not reproduce enough of his post to establish a full, point-by-point rebuttal. The report says he argued that stablecoins and tokenized deposits have fundamentally different underlying risk structures. 37

That distinction matters because the argument at Jackson Hole was not simply about whether blockchain technology works. It was about which type of digital money should sit at the center of the payment system.

What the BIS argued at Jackson Hole

In his August 28, 2026 speech, BIS General Manager Pablo Hernández de Cos argued that stablecoins, in their current form, are not a credible means of payment at scale. He presented tokenized bank deposits as a more compelling way to use digital ledger technology in everyday payments. 1

The BIS framework begins with two properties of a sound monetary system: a common unit of account and the singleness of money. Under that principle, monetary instruments denominated in the same unit should be redeemable at par into central-bank money, with finality. The BIS also emphasizes interoperability between platforms and instruments. 12

This is a system-level test. It asks not only whether one issuer can honor redemptions, but whether different forms of money continue to function as one reliable payment instrument during normal conditions and periods of stress.

The likely fault line in Ardoino’s response

The available report does not provide a complete Ardoino quotation, so it would be misleading to attribute a detailed argument to him. What can be said is that the reported response focused on a difference in the underlying risk structure between USDT-style stablecoins and tokenized bank deposits. 37

That framing points to the central stablecoin counterargument: a properly regulated issuer can hold segregated, liquid reserves and promise one-to-one redemption, while a commercial bank typically uses deposits to fund lending and performs maturity transformation. From this perspective, criticizing stablecoins for not operating like bank money may confuse two different models rather than prove that one is safer.

The BIS’s answer is that “backed” is not a complete test of money. Reserve quality, legal redemption rights, the speed of liquidation, operational arrangements and run dynamics all affect whether a token can remain reliably redeemable at par. The distinction between reserves and fractional-reserve banking therefore does not settle the broader question of payment-system resilience. 1012

Two definitions of sound digital money

The disagreement is partly about what should be measured.

Stablecoin advocates generally emphasize:

• transparent reserves;
• one-to-one redemption;
• competition among private issuers;
• public-blockchain settlement; and
• access to dollar-denominated digital money across borders.

The BIS emphasizes a wider architecture:

• a common unit of account;
• singleness of money;
• interoperability across networks;
• liquidity in stressed markets;
• financial-integrity controls; and
• a central-bank settlement anchor. 12

In other words, the stablecoin case begins with issuer solvency and user choice. The BIS case begins with the stability of the entire payments and credit system. A token can be useful and well-reserved without automatically becoming a universally accepted form of money at par in every circumstance.

Everyday payments versus specialized uses

Hernández de Cos did not argue that stablecoins have no role. The reported position is that tokenized deposits should handle most routine retail and wholesale payments, while stablecoins may serve more specialized applications. 133

That division reflects the BIS preference for keeping digital payments within the existing two-tier structure: commercial banks issue deposits, while central-bank money provides the settlement foundation. Tokenization would add programmability and potentially improve the movement of money without replacing the institutional structure that supports par settlement.

Stablecoin supporters dispute where the line should be drawn. They point to open networks, around-the-clock settlement, remittances, trading collateral and cross-border transfers as uses that do not fit neatly into traditional banking rails. The stronger version of their argument is that regulation and interoperability can address the weaknesses identified by the BIS without requiring banks to control the main digital payment instruments.

Monetary sovereignty and fragmentation

The policy debate also extends beyond technology. If a foreign-currency stablecoin becomes widely used in a domestic economy, it could increase access to a relatively stable unit of account and improve cross-border payments. It could also encourage currency substitution and reduce the influence of domestic monetary authorities.

The BIS concern is that payments could fragment into issuer-specific or chain-specific forms of money, particularly if tokens are not seamlessly interchangeable. The competing view is that restricting private digital dollars to niche uses may protect incumbent systems at the expense of people and businesses that need cheaper, faster international settlement.

Neither side’s preferred outcome is cost-free. One model risks fragmentation and weaker policy control; the other risks concentrating innovation and payment access inside regulated banking channels.

Bank funding is another major dividing line

The BIS also warns that widespread stablecoin adoption could draw deposits away from banks, increase banks’ funding costs and shift financial intermediation toward non-bank issuers. That could affect the availability and price of credit, although reporting on the speech says the BIS’s model-based estimates of the effect may be modest. 11

Stablecoin proponents treat this concern differently. They argue that competition should be allowed to challenge low-cost bank funding, especially when transaction balances are effectively captive inside the banking system. In that view, higher funding costs are not necessarily a flaw in stablecoins; they may be the market price of removing an implicit advantage enjoyed by banks.

The unresolved question is whether payment deposits are primarily a public monetary function that requires a banking-system anchor, or a competitive product that private issuers should be allowed to provide under strict reserve and consumer-protection rules.

Where the debate stands

The available evidence supports a cautious conclusion rather than a definitive claim that Ardoino defeated the BIS argument. A response was reported, but its full substance is not available in the supplied reporting. 37

What is clear is the shape of the disagreement:

• The stablecoin model favors private issuance, reserve backing, redemption and open-network settlement.
• The BIS model favors tokenized commercial-bank deposits linked to central-bank money, preserving singleness, interoperability and the existing monetary hierarchy. 12

The BIS is not calling for every stablecoin use to disappear. Its argument is that specialized utility does not establish suitability as the foundation for large-scale everyday payments. Stablecoin advocates, including the position attributed to Ardoino, challenge the assumption that bank-based digital money is inherently safer or more efficient than transparent, fully reserved private money.

For now, the strongest fact-based answer is that Ardoino reportedly challenged the BIS’s comparison of risks, but the source record does not show a detailed public rebuttal to Hernández de Cos’s specific speech. The larger policy choice—private, open stablecoins or bank-issued tokens anchored by central-bank money—remains the real issue.