The clearest evidence of an immediate export effect came after the policy began. Chinese imports from Africa reached 193.8 billion yuan, or about $28.72 billion, in May and June, up 23.5% from the same period a year earlier, according to data attributed to China’s General Administration of Customs.
Agricultural products recorded some of the strongest increases. African avocado imports rose 130%, apple imports increased 89.6%, and orange imports grew 27.9% over the comparison period.
These results show how tariff removal can translate into faster market access for products that are already available, compliant with import rules, and capable of reaching Chinese buyers. Chinese officials and diplomatic representatives attributed much of the rise in African imports and the record bilateral total to the new zero-tariff treatment. The data, however, covers only the first months of implementation, so it demonstrates an early association rather than proving that tariffs alone caused the entire increase.
Nigeria was one of the most visible country-level examples of the policy’s early effect. Nigeria-China bilateral trade reached $18 billion in the first half of 2026, a 35% year-on-year increase, according to statements by Nigerian and Chinese officials.
Chinese imports from Nigeria rose 80% to $2.3 billion during the same period. The increase suggests that Nigerian suppliers were able to take advantage of lower market-entry costs and existing Chinese demand, particularly for commodities.
That success also prompted a warning from Nigeria’s government: the country should aim to export more value-added agricultural, mineral, and manufactured products, rather than simply increase shipments of raw commodities.
This distinction matters. A larger export bill can improve foreign-exchange earnings without substantially changing an economy’s production structure. Processing, packaging, manufacturing, and related services generally create more opportunities to retain value domestically than the export of unprocessed materials alone. The Nigerian debate therefore treats the zero-tariff policy as an opportunity—but not as a substitute for industrial policy.
Somalia’s response focused on its marine economy. In July 2026, Somalia and China signed a protocol allowing Somali seafood products to enter China duty-free, subject to the requirements set out in the agreement. Eligible products include tuna, lobster, and other wild marine products.
The agreement was signed in Mogadishu by Somalia’s fisheries minister, Ahmed Hassan Aden, and China’s ambassador, Wang Yu. For Somalia, the protocol offers a practical route from broad preferential access to a defined export channel for fisheries.
Somali officials have linked the opportunity to wider plans for developing the country’s marine resources and fisheries revenue. Somalia also announced a tax exemption for fish exporters shipping to China, adding a domestic incentive alongside the removal of Chinese import duties.
The example illustrates both the promise and the conditions of the policy. Duty-free entry helps, but seafood exporters still need landing infrastructure, cold storage, quality controls, traceability, and dependable logistics to supply the Chinese market consistently.
The headline trade number includes both imports and exports. A larger bilateral total therefore does not automatically mean that African exports are catching up with Chinese sales to Africa.
Officials and analysts have continued to focus on the imbalance in the trading relationship. China’s exports to Africa remain substantially larger than its imports from the continent, and the supplied reporting describes Africa’s trade deficit with China as exceeding $100 billion in the first half of 2026.
Chinese officials rejected the idea that the imbalance alone proves the relationship is failing, describing the framing as a “discourse trap” and pointing to the role of Chinese capital and intermediate goods in Africa’s imports. The competing interpretations point to the same underlying issue: the value of trade depends not only on its size, but also on what Africa sells, what it imports, and how much production and employment remain on the continent.
Zero tariffs remove a border charge; they do not raise the value of a product. African governments and businesses therefore need to use the market opening to expand agro-processing, mineral beneficiation, fisheries processing, and manufacturing. Nigeria’s call for value-added exports reflects this broader challenge.
Exporters can still be blocked by sanitary and phytosanitary rules, certification requirements, inspection procedures, and inconsistent product standards. Harmonizing national systems and improving exporters’ ability to meet Chinese requirements would make tariff-free access more usable in practice.
Ports, customs procedures, transport networks, and border documentation can impose costs that offset some of the benefit of a zero tariff. Faster clearance and better trade-facilitation systems are therefore essential, particularly for perishable agricultural and seafood products.
Many exporters cannot yet supply the volume, consistency, or quality that large Chinese buyers require. Investment in processing plants, storage, refrigeration, packaging, testing, and quality control would help convert one-off shipments into durable export industries.
The policy is scheduled in the supplied reporting as a time-limited opening, making implementation speed important. Governments that use the window only to increase commodity shipments risk reinforcing the existing export pattern. Governments that combine access with investment, skills, infrastructure, and sector-specific standards have a better chance of turning trade growth into structural transformation.
China’s zero-tariff policy helped create a rapid increase in African exports to China and contributed to a record 1.41 trillion yuan in China-Africa trade during the first half of 2026. Nigeria’s higher bilateral trade and exports, together with Somalia’s seafood protocol, show how the opportunity is beginning to translate into country-level results.
The larger test is whether the policy changes the composition of trade. Without value-added production, compatible standards, efficient logistics, and enough productive capacity, Africa may sell more to China while continuing to import far more than it exports. The tariff opening is significant—but the reforms that determine its lasting impact will take place inside African economies.