How the U.S. and China Are Preparing for Conflict in Space

Satellites are now essential infrastructure for military communications, navigation, intelligence collection, missile warning and command-and-control. That makes orbit a critical supporting theater in any major conflict on Earth—and a growing arena of U.S.-China competition.

The most plausible form of space conflict is unlikely to resemble aircraft dueling at high speed. It is more likely to involve disrupting signals, maneuvering near valuable spacecraft, probing defenses, attacking ground infrastructure or using cyber and electronic warfare to temporarily deny an opponent the satellite services it relies on. U.S. intelligence assesses that counterspace operations would be integral to Chinese military campaigns, and says China has fielded electronic-warfare, directed-energy and anti-satellite capabilities intended to target U.S. and allied satellites. 3

The capabilities being built

China is developing a broad counterspace toolkit. U.S. Space Command testimony identifies direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, ground-based lasers, jammers and maneuverable co-orbital systems among the capabilities of concern. 4 These systems offer different ways to deny or degrade a space service:

• Electronic warfare can jam or spoof satellite signals.
• Directed energy can interfere with or damage sensitive satellite sensors.
• Cyber operations can target spacecraft, ground stations or the links between them.
• Direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons can physically destroy a satellite.
• Co-orbital systems can maneuver near another spacecraft, potentially to inspect, interfere with, protect or attack it.

China’s 2007 direct-ascent anti-satellite test illustrates why destructive attacks carry major costs: the test created more than 2,700 trackable debris pieces, many of which will remain in orbit for decades. 6 Debris can threaten every operator in the same orbital region, including the attacker. That risk gives militaries a strong incentive to consider less visible and potentially reversible methods of interference.

The United States is also developing and operating counterspace capabilities. The Secure World Foundation’s 2025 assessment documented U.S. proximity-operation systems and reported that the United States had deployed at least one acknowledged offensive counterspace system, the Counter Communications System, a jammer. 12 At the same time, the U.S. approach emphasizes better space-domain awareness, more resilient architectures and cooperation with allies—measures intended to make it harder to disable a service by attacking a small number of high-value satellites.

Why close satellite maneuvers matter

Rendezvous and proximity operations—the ability to navigate near another spacecraft—are central to the new competition. They support legitimate missions such as inspection, debris removal, repair and life-extension. But the same ability to identify, approach, dock with or tow an uncooperative satellite could also support coercion or attack.

China has demonstrated notable servicing-related capabilities. The Shijian-21 spacecraft captured a defunct satellite and moved it to a different orbit, according to reporting on the operation. 18 Chinese spacecraft SJ-21 and SJ-25 later conducted close operations that outside observers and a U.S. Space Force official characterized as a likely on-orbit refueling attempt; however, public tracking data could not conclusively establish docking or the transfer of fuel. 1847

That uncertainty is the point. A spacecraft designed to inspect or refuel another satellite may have peaceful uses, yet its proximity and maneuvering capabilities can also create military options. Hardware alone often cannot reveal intent. Analysts should therefore distinguish between a demonstrated capability and evidence of an operational weapon.

U.S. officials have also pointed to synchronized Chinese satellite maneuvers. In 2025, then–Space Force Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. Michael Guetlein described five objects maneuvering around one another “in synchronicity and in control,” calling it “dogfighting in space.” 31 The phrase is evocative but imperfect: satellites do not turn and pursue one another like fighter jets. Orbital maneuvers consume scarce fuel and usually unfold over far longer periods. Still, coordinated proximity operations can help operators practice inspection, tracking, positioning and other tactics relevant to both servicing and counterspace missions.

Spaceplanes add to the ambiguity

Reusable uncrewed spaceplanes are another source of uncertainty. Reporting based on commercial tracking data said that an object released by a Chinese spaceplane looped around another Chinese satellite before moving back toward the spaceplane. 17 The activity is consistent with experimentation in autonomous proximity operations, but it does not by itself demonstrate an operational weapon.

The United States and China both operate uncrewed spaceplanes, while several other countries are pursuing or considering related capabilities. The Secure World Foundation has described growing interest in co-orbital “bodyguard” satellites and spaceplanes, alongside increasingly complex rendezvous and proximity operations. 35 As with servicing satellites, the concern is less the vehicle’s existence than the limited transparency around its payloads, objectives and maneuvering behavior.

Allied operations are becoming operational, not symbolic

The United States is turning alliances into a space-security advantage. From September 4 to 12, 2025, U.S. Space Command and U.K. Space Command conducted their first coordinated satellite maneuver under Multinational Force–Operation Olympic Defender. A U.S. satellite repositioned to examine a U.K. satellite and verify its normal operation. 30

The event matters because it demonstrated that allied commands can plan and execute a rendezvous and proximity operation together. Reuters later reported that China’s Shiyan-12-01 satellite passed about 83 kilometers below the U.S.-U.K. spacecraft during the operation, according to commercial tracking data. 17 The public U.S. account described the mission as an inspection of an allied satellite, not an operation targeting China. 30

France and the United States have also pursued coordinated satellite operations, part of a broader effort to improve allied intelligence-gathering and orbital coordination. 19 Cooperation can strengthen surveillance and resilience, while making it harder for an adversary to isolate a single national space system.

Commercial constellations change the strategic equation

Commercial spacecraft increasingly provide services that militaries value, including communications and Earth observation. Large constellations can improve resilience because their functions are distributed across many satellites rather than concentrated in a few. Yet commercial systems also create difficult questions: their ground stations, data links, supply chains and services may be civilian-owned while supporting military operations.

This blurring of civilian and military roles complicates deterrence and escalation. A state may see a commercial provider that directly supports an opponent’s military as part of the conflict system, even though attacking it could disrupt civilian users and widen a crisis.

What space conflict is most likely to look like

The available evidence supports a sober conclusion: the United States and China are building the ability to operate, defend and potentially interfere with satellites across several layers of conflict. China’s fielded counterspace capabilities and continued investment are documented in U.S. intelligence and military assessments. 34 The United States is combining its own capabilities with tracking, maneuverability, resilience and allied coordination. 1230

The immediate risk is not necessarily a spectacular destruction of satellites in orbit. It is a gray-zone contest in which jamming, spoofing, cyber intrusion, dazzling, suspicious close approaches and attacks on terrestrial space infrastructure may be difficult to attribute quickly. Those actions may be temporary, but they can still disrupt military operations, essential services and crisis decision-making.

The core challenge is transparency. Inspection, repair, refueling and debris-removal technology can make space operations safer and more sustainable. The same capabilities can also create a latent ability to interfere with another spacecraft. Without clearer norms for notification, safe separation and responsible proximity operations, states may increasingly interpret an ambiguous maneuver near a critical satellite as preparation for attack—raising the risk of escalation precisely because intent is so hard to prove.