Iran has also told international bodies that ships considered "non‑hostile" may transit the strait, provided they request authorization and avoid actions seen as supporting aggression against Iran.
This framework transforms the strait from an open maritime passage into something closer to a monitored gateway, where access depends on political and security considerations.
Even with occasional transits, overall traffic remains dramatically lower than before the conflict.
Before the crisis, roughly 125–140 vessels passed through the strait each day. During the conflict, crossings dropped to only a handful per day, representing about 10 percent or less of typical activity.
In late April, ship‑tracking data showed only about six vessels crossing within a 24‑hour period—still just a fraction of normal levels.
Although activity has occasionally increased, such as a reported 55 commodity vessels crossing in a week in mid‑May, this still represents a cautious and uneven recovery rather than a full normalization of global shipping routes.
Some of the most closely watched transits involve ships linked to major Asian oil consumers.
Maritime tracking data showed a Chinese‑owned supertanker carrying nearly two million barrels of Iraqi crude attempting to pass through the strait in May, highlighting how key energy buyers are cautiously resuming shipments.
Asian economies—particularly China, Japan, and South Korea—depend heavily on Gulf oil. Earlier in the crisis, several South Korean tankers were stranded near the strait due to the disruption, illustrating how quickly regional supply chains were affected.
These movements suggest selective reopening rather than full restoration of global traffic: certain vessels are testing or negotiating passage while the broader shipping industry remains cautious.
At the same time, the United States has been applying military and diplomatic pressure to reopen the strait.
After negotiations stalled, Washington imposed a naval blockade targeting Iranian shipping and instructed the U.S. Navy to intercept vessels connected to Iran’s restrictions on transit.
U.S. officials have paired that pressure with ongoing diplomacy. President Donald Trump has said negotiations with Iran are in their “final stages,” while also warning that additional military action could follow if no agreement is reached.
The combination of military pressure and negotiations reflects a broader strategy: restoring international shipping while preventing Iran from permanently controlling access to the chokepoint.
Beyond Washington and Tehran, regional powers are also exploring ways to stabilize the Gulf after the conflict.
Saudi Arabia has reportedly floated the idea of a Middle East non‑aggression pact involving Iran and neighboring states. Diplomats say the proposal is loosely inspired by the Cold War‑era Helsinki process that helped manage tensions between rival blocs.
The initiative reflects widespread concern among Gulf states that even if the war ends, instability around the strait could continue to disrupt energy markets and regional security.
Taken together, recent tanker movements reveal that the Strait of Hormuz is not simply reopening after the conflict. Instead, it is functioning as a geopolitical bargaining tool.
Iran appears to be allowing limited shipping to demonstrate that it can regulate the world’s most important oil corridor, while still maintaining enough uncertainty to preserve leverage in negotiations.
Until a broader political settlement emerges, tanker traffic through Hormuz will likely remain selective, tightly managed, and highly sensitive to the shifting balance between military pressure and diplomacy.
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