The 2026 Hormuz Crisis: Why a Shipping Resumption Isn't a Return to Normal

The most tangible uptick appeared in mid-May. Maritime intelligence firm Kpler recorded 55 commodities vessels—including oil tankers and cargo ships—crossing the strait between May 11 and May 17, a sudden surge after weeks of near-standstill traffic .

Why ‘resumption’ does not mean ‘normal’

Despite these individual transits, the strait’s operating environment remains structurally broken. Several overlapping factors explain why normal commercial operations are nowhere near resuming.

The dual blockade. Neither side has backed down. Iran continues to blockade the strait against what it perceives as “hostile” ships, permitting passage only for friendly or neutral vessels along a route hugging the Iranian coast . Simultaneously, the U.S. Navy enforces a blockade of Iranian ports from the Gulf of Oman. Multiple analysts and industry bodies have described this as a “dual blockade”—a standoff that has strangled traffic from both directions . As of May 22, CENTCOM reported the U.S. had turned away 94 vessels .

Iran’s institutionalized control. What began as wartime disruption is being formalized. On May 18, Iran’s newly established Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) declared itself the “legal institution and representative authority” for managing transit through the strait . This unilateral permit-and-toll system contravenes the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and represents a de facto assertion of sovereignty over international waters. Iranian state media reported that 1,500 vessels were waiting for Iranian permission to transit as part of this broader institutionalization effort .

Extreme risk ratings and active hazards. As of May 5–6, the JMIC maintained a CRITICAL risk rating for the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman, citing navigation interference, blockade enforcement, mine threats, and residual kinetic danger . On May 3 and May 4, just 6 and 5 vessel transits were recorded respectively, compared to a historical daily average of about 138 . Active mine-clearing operations are underway—the Pentagon has estimated that fully clearing the strait of Iranian-laid mines could take up to six months—and a fragile ceasefire has been repeatedly violated .

Skyrocketing costs and operator refusal. War-risk insurance premiums have increased exponentially. Where pre-war premiums stood around 0.125% of a vessel’s value, quotes have reached 5% or more for a single voyage, translating into millions of dollars in additional cost for large tankers . Spot rates for Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) on the Middle East-to-Asia route hit a record $423,736 per day in early May, a 94% increase from the previous week . Even when Iran briefly reopened the strait, S&P Global reported that no firm charter fixtures were being made because tanker operators remained unwilling to risk vessels and crews amid unresolved security and legal risks .

Stranded ships and a paused escort mission. The U.S. launched Operation Project Freedom on May 4 to escort merchant ships out of the Gulf, but the mission was paused within 24 hours after President Trump cited progress in talks with Iran . That left approximately 1,000 vessels and 20,000 seafarers stranded in the Gulf .

In total, a thin stream of mostly Iranian-approved or Navy-escorted vessels has resumed transit since mid-April, producing a measurable but modest traffic spike. But the simultaneous blockades, Iran’s new unilateral transit authority, critical JMIC risk ratings, record insurance and freight costs, active mine hazards, and widespread operator refusal to send unescorted ships all point to the same conclusion: the Strait of Hormuz is nowhere near a functional return to normal commercial operations.