How Iran’s Hard-Liners Allegedly Sabotaged a U.S. Deal With Strait of Hormuz Attacks

The most defensible reading of the reported July Strait of Hormuz attacks is not that every detail of a covert operation has been established, but that a faction within Iran may have acted outside normal political and military channels to destroy a diplomatic opening with the United States. The attacks on three commercial vessels brought swift U.S. military and economic retaliation and intensified the conflict over who sets Iran’s strategy. 123

What reportedly happened

The New York Times reported, citing Iranian regime insiders, that opponents of an agreement with Washington used a clandestine effort to attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. One of the vessels was the Qatar-owned LNG carrier Al Rekayyat, which was reported attacked in waters off Oman; contemporary reporting said three ships were struck amid a fragile recovery in oil and gas shipments through the waterway. 12

The immediate external consequence was clear. The United States said Iran had attacked three commercial vessels, then carried out strikes on Iranian targets and revoked a waiver allowing Iranian oil sales. U.S. Central Command said the strikes targeted, among other assets, air defenses, command-and-control networks, coastal radar, anti-ship capabilities and IRGC small boats. 3

Iran did not publicly claim responsibility for the shipping attacks. 4

How the faction allegedly bypassed Iran’s leadership

Reporting attributed to five Iranian officials and two IRGC members says President Masoud Pezeshkian learned of the strikes after they occurred and angrily called Ahmad Vahidi, the IRGC commander in chief. Vahidi reportedly said he had neither authorized the operation nor known about it in advance. The same account says the Supreme National Security Council was unaware, as was much of the leadership. 1924

That is the core of the alleged rogue-operation account: not a documented technical account of how ships were attacked, but a claim that the decision was compartmentalized outside the president, the IRGC’s formal commander and the national-security council.

The available reporting does not establish the weapons used, the unit that carried out the attacks, the communications chain, or the exact means by which the perpetrators avoided detection. Those details should not be inferred from the claim that senior officials lacked advance knowledge.

Why Hossein Taeb became central to the account

According to reports recounting the Times investigation, inquiries by Iranian government and security bodies traced the decision to strike the vessels to Hossein Taeb, a cleric and former intelligence figure who had opposed an agreement with the United States. 2633

Taeb was subsequently appointed to lead the Basij paramilitary force. Multiple reports describe the appointment as a return to a prominent security role, while Ahmad Vahidi was formally confirmed as IRGC commander in chief. 3941

The promotion does not, by itself, prove why Taeb was rewarded rather than punished. It does, however, fit the broader reported political reality: hard-line opponents of compromise with Washington had been openly organizing against a deal through political pressure, demonstrations, media activity, and private and public messaging. 18 Reporting and analysis also portray Taeb as close to the emerging leadership circle around Mojtaba Khamenei, although the degree of influence and the decision-making process cannot be independently resolved from the materials provided. 3437

What the episode says about Iran’s power struggle

The reported attack exposed a divide between officials who saw diplomacy as a route to reduce pressure on Iran and hard-liners who regarded concessions over the Strait of Hormuz and relations with Washington as unacceptable. 1831

That internal conflict mattered beyond Tehran. Ship attacks put oil and gas flows at risk, and the Strait’s traffic deteriorated sharply amid the escalation: one report recorded just 13 ships transiting on the first full day of a renewed U.S. naval blockade in July. 8 By September, the Times reported that at least 23 vessels had been hit in the waterway during July and August. 6

What remains uncertain

Several broader claims surrounding the episode—including questions about Mojtaba Khamenei’s public visibility, the authenticity of orders issued in his name, and alleged plans involving regional militias, Red Sea locations, or energy infrastructure—are not established by the supplied evidence.

The clearest conclusion is narrower. According to the reporting, an internal hard-line challenge to diplomacy helped turn a tentative U.S.-Iran understanding into renewed military confrontation. The maritime consequences were real and documented; the full covert chain of responsibility remains based on accounts from unnamed Iranian officials and has not been publicly demonstrated in forensic detail. 1219