تسع محافظ مجهولة تتحكم في مصير مليارات الدولارات على منصة Polymarket

1. Proposal Phase: Anyone can propose a market outcome by staking a bond of 750 USDC.e .
2. 2-Hour Challenge Window: Once proposed, there’s a 2-hour period where anyone can dispute the outcome by posting an equal counter-bond .
3. Automatic Resolution (No Dispute): If the window closes without a challenge, the original proposal is accepted, and the proposer gets their bond back plus a reward .
4. Escalation to UMA Token Vote: If the second proposal is also disputed, the case goes to UMA’s Data Verification Mechanism (DVM). UMA token holders then vote, with voting power directly proportional to the number of tokens they hold, to determine the final settlement .

The optimistic oracle design assumes that honest disputers will act as a check on bad proposals. But the final backstop—the DVM vote—is where the real power lies, and it is a pure plutocracy .

The Whale Problem: 9 Wallets, 50% of the Power

Bloomberg’s analysis of blockchain records and past votes revealed that the “crowd” deciding Polymarket’s most contested outcomes is really just a tiny group. Among more than 6,400 participating addresses, nine whale wallets controlled roughly half the total voting power and sided with the winning outcome in nearly all disputes .

Some wallets hold so much sway that their votes can single-handedly decide cases. In multiple documented incidents, a single voter or coordinated group deploying millions of UMA tokens—sometimes representing 25% or more of total voting power in a round—was able to flip a market’s outcome just before finalization .

The anonymity of these wallets compounds the problem. Unlike Kalshi, which resolves disputes internally with clear lines of accountability, Polymarket outsources final authority to an unregulated, pseudonymous jury . Polymarket’s user agreement explicitly states that the platform “assumes no responsibility for resolving disputes related to trading contracts” .

The Conflict of Interest at the Core

What makes this structure genuinely dangerous is the incentive misalignment. Voters frequently hold positions in the very markets they are judging. More than 60% of active UMA voters are linked to Polymarket trading accounts . A voter holding a directional bet or a position on both sides of a market can vote to steer the outcome in their own financial favor—effectively acting as both judge and a financially interested party.

The consequences have been concrete and expensive. Controversial UMA resolutions affected over $30 million in market value in 2025 across markets like the Ukraine minerals deal, the Fort Knox gold audit, and the UFO declassification market . The Iran ceasefire dispute brought even greater scrutiny, not only for its $280M+ volume but for suspicious trading patterns that triggered congressional investigations .

Stalled Reforms and a Broken Check

Awareness of the problem is not new. UMA introduced a “MOOV2” update that restricted voting eligibility to just 37 addresses, an attempt to improve accountability. But the update failed to solve the core concentration problem—it simply formalized a slightly larger oligarchy . Polymarket’s own broader revamp of the voting process has been delayed .

The deeper issue is structural. The optimistic oracle assumes disputers will act as a protective check, but when whales control the final DVM vote, that check becomes functionally meaningless . As one analysis put it: “decentralization in name does not mean decentralization in practice” . Until the voting mechanism itself is fundamentally re-architected—or until Polymarket brings oracle functions in-house, which it is currently exploring through a proposed POLY token—the world’s largest prediction market will continue to rely on a truth-arbitration system controlled by a handful of anonymous wallets .